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In the study of law and economics, there is a danger that historical inferences from theory 
may infect historical tests of theory.  It is imperative, therefore, that historical tests always 
involve a vigorous search not only for confirming evidence, but for disconfirming evidence 
as well.  We undertake such a search in the context of a single well-known case: the Federal 
Radio Commission’s (FRC’s) 1927 decision not to expand the broadcast radio band. The 
standard account of this decision holds that incumbent broadcasters opposed expansion (to 
avoid increased competition) and succeeded in capturing the FRC.  Although successful 
broadcaster opposition may be taken as confirming evidence for this interpretation, our 
review of the record reveals even stronger disconfirming evidence.  In particular, we find 
that every major interest group, not just radio broadcasters, publicly opposed expansion of 
the band in 1927, and that broadcasters themselves were divided at the FRC’s hearings.  
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1.  Introduction 
What is the role of history in the study of law and economics?   
Perhaps its most important role in this context is as a test of theory and a source of 
new hypotheses.  Ronald Coase, for example, famously challenged our understanding of 
public goods by exposing the hidden history of private lighthouses when theory had 
imagined only public ownership.
1  
History can also be informed by theory.  George Stigler once observed that 
important historical inferences about policy intent could be drawn from the economic theory 
of regulation.  Noting that the “theory tells us to look … at who gains and who loses, and 
how much, when we seek to explain a regulatory policy,” he suggested that “the truly 
intended effects [of a policy] should be deduced from the actual effects.”
2  Indeed, inferences 
of this sort have become common in law and economics.
3 
One significant danger is that these two strategies may become intertwined – that 
historical inferences from theory may somehow make their way into historical tests of 
theory.  Surely, such inferences cannot legitimately be adduced as evidence for the theory 
that generated them.  To the extent that historical cases are regarded as support for a theory, 
they must be based on hard evidence, not on inference from the theory itself. 
Avoiding this trap is anything but easy, particularly given the powerful hold that 
certain theories now have within the field.  The economic theory of regulation is a good case 
in point.  When we see an interest group benefit from a regulation, it is now almost 
instinctive to conclude that this was the intended result and that the interest that benefited 
must have been at least partly – and perhaps wholly – responsible for securing the regulation 
in the first place (through lobbying, etc.).
4   
One unfortunate consequence with respect to historical inquiry is that researchers 
may be tempted to scratch around in the documentary record to find what they were looking 
for – to find what they knew in advance, based on theory, had to be there.  To avoid this 
                                                 
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J Law & Econ. 357 (1974). 
2 Stigler, Supplementary Note on Economic Theories of Regulation, in The Citizen and the State 140 (1975) 
[emphasis in the original]. 
3 However, Roger Noll warns of “the lurking danger of tautology, i.e., of attributing causality to an inevitable 
consequence of any public policy action.  It is impossible to imagine that regulation could be imposed without 
redistributing income.  Hence, a look for winners in the process – and organizations that represent them – is 
virtually certain to succeed.” See Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 
Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, at 1276-1277 
(1989).   
4 For example, Thomas Hazlett and Matthew Spitzer write, “One need not assume perfect foresight nor abstract 
from the transactional difficulties in a political world to conclude that when interests with substantial rents at 
stake appear to secure optimal regulatory outcomes they were more than lucky.  Indeed, George Stigler long 
held that it made sense to infer backwards…” [Thomas W. Hazlett and Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television 
and the Quid Pro Quo, 2 Business and Politics 115, 129 n.89 (2000)]. Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  2
trap, it is imperative that the use of history as a test of theory always involve a vigorous 
search not only for confirming evidence, but for disconfirming evidence as well.  Good 
science requires nothing less. 
In this paper, we take up the challenge of using history to test theory by focusing on 
a single well-known case: the Federal Radio Commission’s 1927 decision not to expand the 
broadcast radio band.  
The most widely cited study of this decision was conducted by Thomas Hazlett, who 
concluded that incumbent broadcasters had succeeded in capturing the Federal Radio 
Commission (FRC).  Drawing especially on a primary historical source, the magazine Radio 
Broadcast, Hazlett found that incumbent radio broadcasters – who presumably would have 
suffered from additional competition on an expanded broadcast band – strongly opposed the 
expansion proposal in 1927.
5  He also took for granted that the listening public would have 
benefited from expansion of the band, since it would have gained more choice with respect 
to broadcasting stations.
6 The FRC’s rejection of the expansion proposal thus represented “a 
classic regulatory capture, creating significant industry rents that were shared with political 
constituencies in proportion to their effective influence over policy.”
7 
The fact that a powerful interest group favored a regulatory result that appears 
ultimately to have benefited it stands as a notable piece of confirming evidence for a capture 
interpretation.  It is also necessary, however, to consider what sorts of historical evidence 
would contradict this interpretation and whether any such evidence exists.  
In undertaking this exercise with regard to the FRC’s 1927 decision, we conceived 
of three potential categories of disconfirming evidence: (1) evidence that a broad range of 
groups, in addition to broadcasters, opposed expansion of the broadcast band; (2) evidence 
that at least some incumbent broadcasters did not oppose expansion; and (3) evidence that 
incumbent broadcasters did not in fact benefit from the FRC’s ultimate decision to retain the 
existing band.   
Our review of the historical record, including examination of previously unutilized 
transcripts of the relevant FRC hearings, produced strong disconfirming evidence in 
category 1 (in short, that every major interest group, not just radio broadcasters, publicly 
opposed expansion of the band in 1927); weak disconfirming evidence in category 2 
(namely, that the broadcasters who testified at the FRC hearings were about evenly divided 
between opposition and support for the expansion proposal); and some interesting, but 
ultimately inconclusive, evidence in category 3 (highlighting the relatively bleak 
expectations about the long-term profitability of commercial radio as of early 1927).   
                                                 
5 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J. Law & Econ. 
133, 154-158 (1990).  See also Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent-Seeking and the First Amendment, 
91 Col. L. Rev. 905, 918-919 (1997); Thomas W. Hazlett, Underregulation: the Case of the Radio Spectrum, in 
Thomas W. Bell, The Regulators’ Revenge 92 (1998). 
6 Rationality, pp. 155-156. 
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We also searched for additional confirming evidence of a capture interpretation, 
particularly for direct evidence of attempts by incumbent radio broadcasters to influence 
FRC commissioners, but found very little evidence of this type. 
Overall, we conclude that the disconfirming evidence outweighs the confirming 
evidence in this case and thus that the 1927 episode cannot reasonably be taken as support 
for capture theory.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  first, we summarize the logic and 
evidence behind the traditional argument that the FRC’s expansion decision was captured by 
incumbent broadcasters; second, we provide a brief overview of our argument and key 
historical findings, most of which run contrary to the capture interpretation; and third, in two 
consecutive sections that comprise the bulk of the paper, we review the relevant historical 
evidence (including the state of radio in 1927 and the positions of the major interest groups 
on the expansion decision) in considerable detail.  Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the 
implications of our findings and offer some additional thoughts about the proper role of 
history in law and economics. 
2.  The Traditional Story: Capture of the Expansion Decision 
The story of the expansion decision culminates on April 5, 1927, when the Federal 
Radio Commission (FRC) rejected a proposal that would have expanded the 96-channel 
radio broadcast band to include the 50 adjacent higher frequency channels, enlarging the 
550 to 1500 kHz band to include the 1500 to 2000 kHz band.  At the time, nearly all 
observers believed that the airwaves were overcrowded.  Over 700 stations across the 
country were broadcasting simultaneously on the allotted 96 channels, resulting in 
significant interference.  Enlarging the broadcast band would have allowed the retention of 
all existing stations, and also would have given new broadcasters a share of the broadcasting 
landscape.  Hazlett argues that by rejecting the expansion proposal, the FRC displayed a 
clear preference for the anti-competitive interests of incumbent broadcasters over the interest 
of consumers (listeners) in a larger choice of stations. 
    In Hazlett’s view, no reasonable, impartial regulator could have made such a 
decision: “If regulators had made a good-faith, even if analytically unsophisticated, attempt 
to deal straightforwardly with overcrowding of the airwaves, their first step should have 
been to allow for an expansion of available broadcasting frequencies.”
8 Hazlett maintains 
that no technological barrier blocked the use of those channels.  In fact, a band 60 times 
larger than that assigned to broadcasters was “known to be potentially available given then 
current technology,” having already been assigned for other communications uses.
9    
The “radio industry’s argument”  for artificially limiting this nearly boundless terrain 
was that expansion would harm consumers with first generation radios, by forcing them to 
buy new receivers.  This “transparently false” argument, as Hazlett characterizes it, 
                                                 
8 Rationality 155-156. 
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misrepresented the gains from expansion: “Clearly, consumers would be better off having a 
choice between listening to an uncluttered one-MHz band on an existing radio and 
purchasing a broader-band receiver so as to enjoy enhanced program selection, than in being 
given only the first alternative.”
10   
  Hazlett offers evidence for the broadcasters’ position on spectrum expansion by 
quoting from the “trade journal” Radio Broadcast.
11  He observes that “the industry was 
most concerned about how the FRC would deal with ‘such dangerous propositions as the 
pressure to extend the broadcast band...; the fatuous claims of the more recently licensed 
stations to a place in the ether; and the uneconomic proposals to split time on the air rather 
than eliminate excess stations wholesale...,’ as one trade journal forthrightly summarized.”  
He quotes from the same journal to highlight the broadcasters’ relief and satisfaction once 
the commission had rendered its decision: “‘Broadening of the band was disposed of with a 
finality which leaves little hope for the revival of that pernicious proposition; ... the 
commissioners were convinced that less [sic.] stations was the only answer.’”
12   
3.  A New Look at the Historical Record: The Presence of Disconfirming Evidence 
Although the traditional story of why the FRC rejected the proposal to expand the 
broadcast band in 1927 seems logical (and fully consistent with the economic theory of 
regulation), a thorough review of the available documents – including newly rediscovered 
transcripts of the FRC’s hearings on the subject in late March and early April of 1927 – 
reveals a surprising amount of disconfirming evidence not previously presented.   
3.1  A Broad Coalition Against the Expansion Proposal 
To begin with, radio broadcasters were neither the only, nor the staunchest, 
opponents of expansion.  In fact, almost every interest group represented at the hearings 
opposed expansion, leading the Washington Post to run a story under the headline, “Radio 
Witnesses Unanimous Against Wider Wave Bands.”
13 These opponents included not only 
radio broadcasters, but also radio engineers (who claimed that the proposed frequencies 
were inferior for broadcasting and that designing new radios to receive those frequencies 
would prove complicated and costly), radio manufacturers (who shared the engineers’ 
concerns and expressed an unwillingness to antagonize their customers by supporting a 
                                                 
10 Rationality 155-156. 
11 Rationality, 154. 
12 Rationality, 155. 
13 Washington Post, March 30, 1927, at 4.  In a Columbia Law Review article, Hazlett reaffirmed his claim that 
“[r]adio broadcast interests bitterly opposed” the proposal to expand the broadcast band by citing the FRC’s 
1927 annual report, which “noted that ‘[u]nited opposition to widening the broadcasting band in order to 
accommodate more stations was expressed at the hearings by representatives of the radio art, science, and 
industry…’” [Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 918 and 918-919n45].   
Clearly, though, in using the phrase “representatives of the radio art, science, and industry,” the commission 
meant to cover multiple interests associated with radio (engineers, amateurs, manufacturers, etc.), not just 
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decision that would render existing radios obsolete), amateur radio operators and inventors 
(who did not want to lose access to the proposed frequencies, in part because they believed 
their early experimentation with television had to take place on those frequencies), and 
representatives of radio listeners’ organizations (which echoed concerns about higher-cost 
radios and lower-quality reception associated with the expanded band and which apparently 
preferred a smaller number of high quality stations to a larger number of low quality ones).
14  
Given the broad alignment of interests against the proposal to expand the band, it would 
have been shocking indeed had the FRC decided in favor of it.
15 
3.2  Broadcasters Were Divided 
Perhaps most surprising of all, the group that was weakest in its opposition to 
expanding the broadcast band – or at least expressed the most ambivalence about the 
outcome – comprised the broadcasters themselves.  Although one might dismiss such 
ambivalence as merely a clever exercise in positioning, allowing the broadcasters to hide 
their true motives from the public, there is reason to believe that their ambivalence was 
sincere.  The biggest player in the broadcasting business, NBC, owned relatively few 
stations itself and received a significant part of its revenue from selling network 
programming to other stations.  For NBC, therefore, a broader band – and thus more stations 
– could potentially have meant increased demand for its primary product.   
Hazlett, it turns out, may have inadvertently mischaracterized the intensity of the 
broadcasters’ position by misinterpreting a source.  Specifically, the “trade journal” that he 
cited in characterizing the position of the broadcasters – Radio Broadcast – was not in fact a 
broadcasters’ trade journal in 1926-27, but rather a radio enthusiasts and listeners’ 
                                                 
14 While some speakers at the 1927 hearings referred to having received “invitations,” Herbert Hoover’s 
assistant observed in a letter at the time that “the Radio Commission has sent out a blanket invitation to all 
people in the country who desire either to appear in person or to submit their recommendations in writing.  I do 
not understand that the Commission has sent for any particular individuals, however” [Letter from George 
Akerson, assistant to Sec. Hoover, to Mrs. James T. Rourke, Box 497, Commerce Period Papers, Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library (March 29, 1927)]. 
15 In documenting this consensus opinion against expansion, we focus below mainly on the views expressed by 
the various interests (manufacturers, broadcasters, amateurs, listeners, etc) prior to the announcement of the 
FRC decision.  However, we also reviewed coverage in six major newspapers (the Atlanta Constitution, the 
Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington 
Post) in the month following the decision.  Significantly, none of these papers expressed opposition – or 
reported on any opposition – to the decision during this period.  For example, a New York Times editorial on 
ways to deal with the interference problem did not object to limiting the band.  Instead it repeated, without 
comment, the arguments that to widen it would encroach on “necessary forms of radio communication” and 
would force “millions of radio sets” to be rebuilt (The Radio Dilemma, NY Times, April 4, 1927, p. 22).  
Another article equated widening the band with “invading air channels now used by amateurs” (Asks City 
Control of Broadcasting, NY Times, April 5, 1927, p. 32).  A later article in the Times reiterated the fears of 
“junking ... millions of dollars’ worth of radio receiving sets built to operate on the present broadcasting band,” 
and added that setting the band aside for experimentation was intended to “encourage radio development and 
with a view to effecting television” (Wave Band Taken to Aid Television, NY Times, April 6, 1927, p. 1).  
Other newspapers produced similar coverage.  See e.g. Amateurs of Radio to Protect Wider Wave-Length 
Band, Washington Post, Mar 27, 1927, p. 15; Alfred P. Reck, Radio Men Hear Simple Remedy, Atlanta 
Constitution, March 29, 1927, p. 1; Frank Hinman, Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar 30, 1927, p. 16; Hearings to 
End Chaos, Los Angeles Times, Mar 30, 1927, p. 1; Air Rights of Way, Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1927. Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  6
magazine.  In October 1926, the publication referred to its own typical reader as “Mr. 
Average Radio Enthusiast” and “Mr. Average Listener.”
16  The passages that Hazlett quoted 
from the publication thus reflect not broadcaster opposition, but rather (if anything) listener 
opposition to spectrum expansion.  (For a detailed assessment of Radio Broadcast and its 
readership, see the appendix below.) 
3.3  Expected Broadcaster Rents May Have Been Smaller than Assumed 
Another possible explanation for the ambivalence of certain incumbent broadcasters 
is that less may have been at stake than is now commonly believed.  In early 1927, radio 
advertising was still in its infancy, and broadcasting was not yet viewed as a particularly 
profitable endeavor (and, in a great many cases, as a loss-making endeavor).  As a result, the 
rents that incumbent broadcasters are thought to have been seeking at the time may not have 
provided them with as strong a motivation to oppose expansion as one might assume in 
retrospect (i.e., based on a current understanding of the profitability of broadcasting). 
3.4  What Comes Next: A Detailed Review of the Evidence 
The next two sections of the paper presents this new evidence in detail.  We begin 
with a brief portrait of radio circa 1927, which suggests that the broadcasters’ incentive to 
restrict entry may not have been nearly as strong at the time as one might now assume from 
a modern vantage point.  We then review the positions of each of the major groups with an 
interest in the broadcast band – radio engineers, radio manufacturers, radio broadcasters, 
amateur operators and experimenters, and radio listeners.  This reveals (1) that all of the 
major groups opposed the expansion proposal in 1927 and (2) that the broadcasters were 
less united on the subject than has been reported in the literature.  Finally, in the conclusion, 
we offer an overall assessment of the evidence in t h i s  c a s e  a s  w e ll as some general 
observations about the use of qualitative history in hypothesis testing and the importance of 
vigorously searching for disconfirming – as well as confirming – evidence in the historical 
record. 
Although the historical evidence presented in the pages that follow is offered in 
considerably greater depth than is typical outside of a history journal, we believe such 
granularity (and attention to primary sources) is essential if history is to be used credibly as a 
test of theory.  As almost any criminal lawyer will attest, critical details can easily be 
misinterpreted from a distance – with bias and presumption gradually replacing true 
observation as distance increases.  It is for this reason that, after summarizing the argument 
and evidence above, we now move on to take a closer look at the evidence (and the 
surrounding historical context) in the sections below. 
                                                 
16 See Kingsley Welles, Meet Mr. Average Radio Enthusiast, 9 Radio Broadcast 531 (October 1926).   
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4.  A Portrait of Radio, Circa 1927 
In 1927, radio was, if not in its infancy, at least still in its early childhood, and 
modern broadcast advertising had barely been conceived.  As a result, inferences about the 
1920s radio industry based on present circumstances (or even those of radio’s golden age in 
the 1930s and 1940s) are likely to prove far off the mark.  An accurate characterization of 
radio during the early days of the FRC is essential in setting the context for the expansion 
story and thus in laying the foundation for a serious historical examination of the FRC’s 
decision. 
4.1  The Radio Landscape 
The traditional birth date of broadcasting is November 2, 1920.  On that day, the 
Pittsburgh station KDKA broadcast news of Warren G. Harding’s victory in the presidential 
election, transmitting on its 100-watt set from six o’clock in the evening until noon the next 
day.
17  More than a thousand broadcasters entered the field over the next six-and-a-half 
years, such that by the time the FRC was formed in 1927 there were 733 stations vying for 
the 96 channels between 550 and 1500 kilohertz.
18 
In the intervening years, radio had grown from fad to national habit.  One radio 
retailing journalist estimated that in 1927 there were 6.5 million homes with radio sets, 
playing to an audience of 25 million.
19  Major newspapers published daily radio schedules, 
and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover had already held four national conferences on 
radio broadcasting.  In less than a decade, radio had catapulted from an amateur fixation to a 
matter of national importance. 
But radio in 1927 bore only incipient resemblance to today’s advertising-driven 24-
hour network television and radio programming, or to the golden age of radio in the popular 
imagination.  Most commercial stations broadcast at between 250 and 1000 watts of power 
(a miniscule amount compared to today’s many 50 kilowatt stations) with a range of 
approximately 10-20 miles.
20 Universities, churches, and other non-profit organizations 
primarily operated “local” stations, with service for only a few surrounding miles, but many 
general interest broadcasters also operated locally. 
While we often associate early radio with dramatic serials, radio drama had not fully 
developed by 1927.  In fact, music dominated from the beginning.  A 1925 survey shows 
that over 70 percent of radio content was live music, followed by informational broadcasting 
(including education and news) at 12 percent, with drama (mostly play readings) at one-
                                                 
17 Christopher N. Sterling and John Michael Kittross, Stay Tuned 66 (3
rd ed. 2002).    
18 Lawrence Frederick Schmeckebier, The Federal Radio Commission 23 (1932).  Six of these channels had, by 
agreement, been reserved for Canadian broadcasters. 
19 Orestes Caldwell, The Radio Market, in Radio and its Future 206 (1930).    
20 For power and distance figures, see Conference Held at Washington, D. C., starting Tuesday, March 29, 
1927 before the Federal Radio Commission: Minutes 93-94 (unpublished transcript, Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library, April 1927).  For overall power ratings, see Department of Commerce, Commercial and 
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tenth of one percent.
21  The weekly radio program guide in the New York Times for March 
27, 1927, suggests that broadcasting remained highly skewed toward music as the FRC was 
being established.
22   
Network programming was still novel.  Even network affiliates produced much of 
their programming locally, and these stations often switched to their network feed only in 
the evening hours.
23  The only major network as of early 1927 was the National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC), which first went on the air on November 15, 1926.
24 It was 
the child of “big radio” from the outset, with General Electric and Westinghouse each 
owning 25 percent, and the behemoth Radio Corporation of America (RCA) owning the 
remaining 50 percent.
25  NBC was born when the conglomerate purchased the WEAF-based 
network that AT&T had been operating since 1924, added that network to RCA’s own 
WJZ-based network, and connected all 19 stations with AT&T’s telephone lines.
26 
The network was first and foremost a content provider rather than a station owner.  
When the radio commission was established, NBC still owned only WEAF directly, and the 
combined holdings of NBC, RCA, GE, and Westinghouse amounted to only ten stations out 
of 733.
27  NBC’s two primary sources of income were revenue from nationally sponsored 
programs and fees collected from local affiliates for its unsponsored or “sustaining” 
programs.
28  But even NBC was a new-comer to the sponsorship game: as late as September 
1926, the RCA network did not accept payment for the “indirect advertising programs” they 
broadcast, merely transmitting sponsor-produced programs at no charge to the sponsors.
29 
4.2  The Role of Advertising in Early Radio 
As late as the mid 1920s, even the most thoughtful scholars and journalists were 
unable to predict the dominant role that advertising would play in radio broadcasting by the 
start of the next decade.  In fact, throughout much of the 1920s there was no consensus that 
broadcasters would be able to sustain their operations without outside support. 
                                                 
21 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 81. 
22 Radio Programs for Current Week, N. Y. Times, March 27, 1927, at 21.  While this listing does not include 
the smallest stations broadcasting in the New York area, it does represent many of the stations an average set in 
Manhattan could receive. 
23 Note, however, that because often listeners tuned in only after supper, many stations broadcast solely during 
evening hours, leaving their assigned frequencies idle for the remainder of the day. 
24 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 117. 
25 RCA itself was founded by GE, which retained with Westinghouse a plurality ownership of RCA shares. 
26 The early days of radio, Museum of American Heritage: When Radio Was King exhibit, 
http://www.moah.org/exhibits/archives/radio/earlydays.html, visited November 3, 2003.  
27 These stations were Westinghouse’s KDKA, KFKX, KYW and WBZ; GE’s KGO, KOA and WGY; RCA’s 
WJZ and WRC; and NBC’s WEAF.  See Commerce, Radio Stations. 
28 Sustaining Program, Museum of Broadcast Communication Encyclopedia of Television, 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/S/htmlS/sustainingpr/sustainingpr.htm, visited November 3, 2003. 
29 Austin C. Lescarboura, How Much it Costs to Broadcast, 9 Radio Broadcast 367-371 (1926). Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  9
Hiram Jome’s extensive 1925 study, Economics of the Radio Industry, repeatedly 
returns to “the ‘who shall pay’ problem.”
30 Jome estimated that radio broadcasting was 
bound to be unprofitable, since the “few sources of income, such as paid advertising,” would 
be unlikely to cover the considerable expenses of a commercial station (including normal 
operating expenses, royalties, and so forth).
31  The discrepancy seemed so obvious that Jome 
proposed a tax on radio manufacturers’ sales to make up the difference.
32   
But if the average radio station was not expected to pay for itself, then why were so 
many stations established in the twenties?  Some owners, presumably, expected to beat the 
average.  Others, perhaps, were not primarily interested in making money.  By our count, 
one-quarter of stations in 1927 were non-profits, ranging from religious stations to 
agricultural information stations to university stations.
33   
Many for-profit owners, meanwhile, sought to make money only indirectly.   
According to Radio Broadcast, these included “individual publicity stations operated by 
department stores, newspapers, radio companies, and other commercial institutions for the 
purpose of building good will for the owner, but not accepting outside pay for 
broadcasting.”
34  In fact, the first (and probably most prominent) station owners during the 
1920s were radio manufacturers, who initially entered broadcasting to boost demand for 
their receivers.
35 
Perhaps most striking of all from a modern vantage point, paid advertising as we 
know it today was not originally regarded as an ideal or dominant financing mechanism for 
broadcasting.  In fact, direct advertising over the airwaves was practically an afterthought in 
                                                 
30 Hiram Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry 183 (Chicago: A. W. Shaw & Co. 1925).  See also Susan 
Smulyan, Selling of Radio: The Commercialization of American Broadcasting 1920-1934, esp. Ch. 3 (1994). 
31 Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry, 253-254. 
32 Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry, 254-255. Also reflecting concern about radio’s financial future, 
Radio Broadcast offered a $500 prize in March of 1925 to the best plan for funding broadcasting.  The winning 
idea was a proposal for a receiver tax reminiscent of the BBC’s.  David Sarnoff himself advocated 
“philanthropic donations to support radio” in 1926, the same year that a GE spokesman predicted that 
broadcasting would eventually be supported by either “voluntary contributions or receiver licenses,” according 
to Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 80. 
33 To produce our estimate of the proportion of non-profit stations, we looked at the names of station owners 
that are listed in the Commerce Department’s guide to U.S. radio stations for 1927.  Assuming stations owned 
by such organizations as the First Baptist Church of Shreveport, Louisiana, or the South Dakota State College 
were non-profits, we counted 170 non-profits out of a total of 694 stations listed.  See Department of 
Commerce, Commercial and Government Radio Stations of the United States, 72-92 (1927).  
34 Austin C. Lescarboura, How Much it Costs to Broadcast, 9 Radio Broadcast 367-371 (1926). 
35 As RCA’s David Sarnoff wrote, “When the radio industry outgrew its first customer – the radio amateur – 
the electrical industry of the United States undertook to create a listening public” [David Sarnoff, Art and 
Industry, in Radio and its Future 187 (1930)].  Similarly, the Wall Street Journal announced to its readers in 
November 1926 that RCA, “with its subsidiary company, the National Broadcasting Co., is preparing better and 
bigger programs, and this is the key to increased sales of radio sets” [Radio Having Biggest Year, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 2, 1926, at 9].  Not everyone agreed, however, that increased radio sales would be sufficient to support 
broadcasting. One contemporary radio commentator declared in September of 1926 that “no manufacturer and 
not even a group of manufacturers could afford to broadcast throughout the entire country day in and day out in 
return for the sale of radio receivers and radio accessories” [Lescarboura, How Much It Costs]. Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  10
the minds of many broadcasters.  When Jome asked a sample of 69 broadcasters in 1925 
their purpose in broadcasting, only two responded that even their secondary purpose was “to 
profit by direct sale of advertising time.”
36  Part of the reason for this may have been that 
direct advertising – the explicit discussion of products that we recognize as advertising today 
– was often viewed by the public as distasteful in the 1920s.  The 1925 National Radio 
Conference, organized by Herbert Hoover, held that “both direct and mixed advertising 
were objectionable to the listening public.”
37  In 1927, a representative of the United States 
Radio Society, which identified itself as a listeners’ organization, told the FRC that it had 
“received many communications of protest against the use of the air as a means of direct 
advertising.  The opposition to this type of broadcasting has been so strong that the society 
has recently started a campaign against this evil.”
38   
An alternative form of advertising involved indirect or “good will” advertising, 
similar to today’s PBS underwriting, in which the sponsor’s name would appear in the 
program’s title – the Everready and Atwater Kent Hours were prominent examples – or in 
brief mention at the end of the program.  The sponsors’ products were also likely to figure in 
the programs themselves.
39  While listeners came to accept these indirect advertisements, 
even this was only grudgingly conceded in many cases.
40 
What little we know of radio finances in the 1920s only reinforces this picture of 
financial uncertainty.
41  Even by our most conservative estimate, regular operating costs in 
                                                 
36 Jome, Economics of the Radio Industry, 168.   
37 Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for Regulation of Radio, 
November 9-11, 1925, issued by the Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C. for the Department of 
Commerce (1925).   
38 Minutes, April 1, 1927, 354.  In a review of listeners’ organizations in its July 1927 issue, Radio Broadcast 
characterized the United States Radio Society as the “most promising [listeners’] organization from which we 
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(New York: IEEE Press 1984). 
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Lescarboura, How Much it Costs to Broadcast, 9 Radio Broadcast 367-371 (1926).  Such an expansive notion 
of sponsorship – which sounds so quaint today – accurately reflects the still-primitive state of radio advertising 
just one year before the establishment of the FRC. 
40 In a morbidly comic cartoon from 1928, a listener subject to too many sponsor announcements bombs his 
local radio station.  The Events Leading Up to the Tragedy, N. Y. World (September 19, 1928), reprinted in 
Smulyan, Selling Radio. 
41 A monograph on radio advertising written in 1934 found that a full tally of profits was only possible 
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broadcasting in 1927 exceeded total advertising revenues, which have been estimated at 
$4.8 million that year.
42  In a February 1927 speech, RCA president James G. Harbord told 
the company’s trustees, “We are breaking even in our national broadcasting proposition.  
We had no thought of making money in this venture, but we wanted to give the public the 
best possible radio program and I think we have succeeded in doing this.  If we continue to 
break even I will be more than satisfied.”
43 
  In retrospect, it seems that this environment was beginning to change in 1927, at 
least with respect to radio advertising.  In a July 8, 1928 speech at the International 
Advertising Convention, NBC’s Frank Arnold declared that just eighteen months before 
(i.e., in early 1927), “the attitude of the advertising agents of the country toward Broadcast 
Advertising was either negative or indifferent....  Nowhere along the agency line was there 
any marked enthusiasm, to say nothing of general acceptance.”
44  But, according to Arnold, 
that indifference had finally given way to genuine interest roughly six months later – in mid 
1927 – when “Radio Broadcasting was recognized as an advertising medium by the 
International Advertising Association.”
45  Similarly, Sterling and Kittross suggest that “it 
was not until 1928 that broadcast advertising clearly became the breadwinner for American 
radio broadcasting”
46 – one year after passage of the Federal Radio Act on February 23, 
1927.
47 
On the eve of broadcast regulation, therefore, the radio landscape and the financing 
of radio both dramatically differed from what we might expect, given our current 
assumptions about the economics of broadcasting.  Back in 1927, networks were still 
relatively new and immature.  Live music broadcasts dominated the dial.  Direct advertising 
(now practically the universal mode of financing radio) had few supporters.  There was no 
consensus about how, or whether, broadcasting would ever be profitable.  Thus, in 
considering the incentives of various radio interest groups a t  t h e  d a w n  o f  t h e  R a d i o  
Commission, it may not be appropriate to assume that commercial broadcasters anticipated 
the sort of rents that would later accrue to them as advertising matured. 
                                                                                                                                                 
station ownership further complicated the matter” [Herman S. Hettinger, A Decade of Radio Advertising 108 
(Univ. Chicago P, 1934)]. 
42 The 1951 Yearbook issue of Broadcasting magazine estimated that, for the entirety of 1927, advertising 
expenditure on radio totaled $4.8 million, with $3.8 million of that going to national networks.  To put this 
figure in some perspective, it is worth noting that sales of radio sets were widely estimated to have totaled $168 
million that year [Caldwell, The Radio Market].  Our rough estimate of total operating costs for broadcasting in 
1927 ranges from $5.7 million to $18.3 million; it is based on Jome’s 1924 survey of broadcasters, at 174-175, 
suggesting that average annual costs ranged from a lower bound of $7800 to an upper bound of $24,900 that 
year (not including installation expenses) and the fact that there were 733 stations in operation in 1927. 
43 Promising Radio Year Predicted by Harbord, Wall St. J., February 7, 1927, at 16. 
44 Frank A. Arnold, Popular Reactions to Radio Broadcasting 13 (National Broadcasting Company 1928).  
45 Frank A. Arnold, Popular Reactions to Radio Broadcasting, 5. 
46 Sterling and Kittross, Stay Tuned, 80. 
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4.3  The Federal Radio Commission 
The Radio Commission itself, which was created under the Radio Act of 1927, 
succeeded the Commerce Department, which had previously exercised authority over radio 
based on the Radio Act of 1912.  The 1912 legislation, ostensibly aimed at regulating 
amateur radio operators, had passed in Congress after amateurs interfering with ship distress 
signals impeded rescue efforts to save survivors of the Titanic disaster.  Although the 1912 
act did not explicitly cover broadcasting, Herbert Hoover’s Commerce Department assumed 
that it had the authority to grant broadcast licenses and continued to believe this through 
1926.  Having convened a series of National Radio Conferences from 1922 to 1925, 
Commerce followed the resulting recommendations in (1) limiting broadcasting to the 550 - 
1500 kHz band, (2) separating broadcast stations by at least 10 kHz, (3) preferring high-
power national stations to local low-power ones, and (4) awarding a limited number of free 
licenses to stations on the grounds of service to the public interest – all prominent features of 
what would become the FRC regime.
48  
A period of “chaos” began when Commerce attempted to deny the Zenith Radio 
Corporation the right to broadcast on the 910 kHz channel.  Unhappy with the crowded 930 
kHz channel that it had been allotted, Zenith ignored Commerce and “jumped” to the 910 
channel in December 1925.  Although Hoover’s Commerce Department sued Zenith, the 
courts ruled the following year that Commerce had no power to refuse requests for 
broadcast frequencies.  Apparently acting on advice from the Attorney General, who 
concurred that the 1912 Act “provided no criteria for licensing,” Hoover chose not to 
appeal.
49 
With Commerce now effectively on the sidelines, hundreds of incumbent stations 
proceeded to jostle for better frequencies and time assignments, and hundreds of new 
stations entered on existing and intermediate channels.  This caused considerable 
interference – far worse than the typical static that today’s AM listeners still hear.  Radio 
Commissioner Orestes Caldwell subsequently described the interference as being “so bad at 
many points on the dial that the listener might suppose instead of a receiving set he had a 
peanut roaster with assorted whistles.”
50  Although Congress had considered over 50 radio 
bills since 1921,
 the outbreak of chaos on the airwaves was apparently enough to provoke it 
finally to pass one – the 1927 Radio Act – in February of that year.
51 
The primary innovations of the new Radio Act were the creation of an independent 
commission, the FRC, with the authority to regulate the radio spectrum and to license 
broadcasters, and the assertion that radio frequencies were inalienable public property, to be 
dispensed according to “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”
52  While the original 
1927 legislation established the commission for only one year, in order to clear up the 
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“chaos,” the FRC was renewed annually until the 1934 Communications Act replaced it 
with the permanent Federal Communications Commission.
53 
In passing the 1927 act, Congress had worried a great deal about the threat of 
concentrated control over the broadcasting spectrum, especially given the extraordinary 
political significance of radio.
54  Presumably, its decision to vest control of all frequencies 
with the federal government (and to prohibit private ownership of the spectrum) was seen as 
a sufficient response to that threat, preventing any individual or group from buying up a 
large number of stations and thus obtaining (and exercising) undue political influence.   
Having taken control of the spectrum, however, the federal government simultaneously 
assumed responsibility for managing it.  And this is where the FRC came in.  By all 
accounts, the commission’s primary mission was to clean up the airwaves – to make order 
out of the chaos. 
Accordingly, the FRC’s battle cry was “an end to interference.”  Chairman Eugene 
Sykes told the House that “the commission understands, under the law, that the dominant 
intent and purpose of that law, so far as the broadcasting situation is concerned, which we 
understood was the most acute problem then confronting the commission, it is [sic.] our 
duty to try and ensure good radio reception to the listening public.”
55   Henry  Bellows, 
another commissioner, was just as explicit during the first public hearings, saying: “You all 
know what the immediate problem before the Commission is – the problem of reallocating 
and re-arranging the wave lengths within the broadcasting band so as to eliminate, or at any 
rate greatly reduce, the amount of interference between stations.”
56   
To that end, the FRC called public hearings from March 29 to April 1 of 1927 in 
order to solicit and evaluate ideas for how best to manage the broadcasting spectrum.  As 
Commissioner Bellows explained at the outset of the initial session, a proposal for 
“widening of the broadcast band” was taken up first “because, obviously, in working out the 
policies of the Commission it is going to be necessary to determine first of all whether the 
only channels available for broadcasting are the channels now assigned to this service, or 
whether, from the standpoint of the listener, the broadcaster, the manufacturer, and the users 
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of other types of radio transmission it is going to be better at this time to make a change in 
the broadcasting band.”
57 
5.  Expanding the Broadcasting Band: A Decidedly Unpopular Proposal 
  Although the proposal to expand the broadcast band became the first topic of 
discussion at the FRC hearings, it is not entirely clear where the proposal originated.   
Commissioner Bellows noted early on in the first session that “a great many of those who 
have written to us have very strongly urged this change.”
58 However, he seemed to 
contradict himself on this point the very next day when he announced that over 3000 letters 
had been analyzed so far and that on “the subject ... of widening the broadcast band, it is 
quite extraordinary how few letters have come into the Commission advocating a change in 
the broadcast band.”
59  
  In any case, the main proposal on the table would have enlarged the existing 96-
channel 550-1500 kHz (545 to 200 meters) band to include 50 more channels on the 1500-
2000 kHz (200-150 meters) portion of the spectrum.
60  Participants at the hearings appeared 
to view the expansion proposal primarily as an option for reducing interference by moving 
some existing stations to the new band, although they also recognized that new broadcasting 
spectrum would likely spur new broadcasting entrants as well.
61   
  Opposition to this proposal was nearly universal at the hearings.  In fact, the 
opposition was so strong and so widespread that it seemed to catch the commissioners by 
surprise, leading them to ask whether “there are any persons present who do advocate the 
increase of the broadcasting band....”
62  
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58 Minutes, March 29, 1927, 32. 
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Before moving on to each of the groups that testified at the hearings, it is worth 
noting that our assessment is based to a very significant extent on historical records that 
have remained largely unexamined until now – namely, the transcripts of the FRC’s first 
public hearings.  These transcripts, which we obtained from the Herbert Hoover Presidential 
Library after being informed that they could not be located at the National Archives, 
represent the most exhaustive available record of debate and testimony on the expansion 
issue.  A great many individuals representing the full gamut of radio interest groups made 
their case to the Commission over several days of hearings.  Perhaps the most remarkable 
fact to emerge from their testimony – and the one that most starkly contrasts with the 
prevailing view within the literature – is that nearly all the of interest groups represented at 
the hearing agreed on the inadvisability of the expansion proposal.  Far from standing alone 
on the issue, broadcasters who objected to expansion joined engineers, manufacturers, 
amateur operators, and listeners in opposing the plan to add new frequencies to the 
broadcast band. 
5.1  Radio Engineers 
  The strongest arguments against expansion were generally articulated by radio 
engineers, who questioned whether the substantial technical challenges and difficulties 
associated with the proposal could be justified.  Specifically, the engineers emphasized that 
the new wavelengths would not be conducive to reliable broadcasting; that transmissions on 
the additional frequencies would face harmonic interference from high-powered stations on 
the existing frequencies; and that new radios covering the expanded band would be difficult 
to design, would offer poorer performance, and would be considerably more expensive. 
  Professor Louis Hazeltine, inventor of the neutrodyne receiver and a member of the 
board of the Hazeltine Corporation, a radio manufacturer, explained in a letter to the 
commission that “the designing engineer well knows that to increase the frequency covered 
by radio receivers will either make its performance poorer at each frequency which it covers 
or else will make it considerably more expensive, or more likely of all, will both impair its 
performance and increase its cost.”  He suggested that although  
the present frequency band was allotted to broadcasting largely by reason of 
special circumstances ... it is ... just the band that the designing engineer 
would pick out as the most suitable....  The reason is that the natural 
selectivity [the ability to tune in just one station] of ordinary tuned circuits in 
the present frequency band is just about right to give the desired fidelity [the 
ability to hear broadcasts clearly] … by covering the side bands [the 5 kHz 
on either side of the broadcasting frequency] and no more.   
Finally, he warned that “at higher frequencies, shorter waves, the selectivity would naturally 
be poorer than is necessary to secure fidelity.”
63 
  R. H. Langley, an engineer associated with the Crosley Radio Corporation, placed 
particular emphasis on the problem of interference: 
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In the present band of frequencies from 750 kilocycles [kHz] down, it is 
possible to receive the second harmonic of each broadcasting station on an 
ordinary broadcast receiver.  This means that if the local station which you 
are anxious to avoid is at 750 kilocycles or below, he is in shadow in the 
upper range of your receiver, and if he is loud enough, you are quite likely to 
get him in two places.  If the band was widened down to 150 meters [2000 
kHz], then 71 of the 146 channels would have this second harmonic 
reflection point and would be received at two points on the receiver, if you 
were near enough to them, and the signal were sufficiently powerful.  ...  
That difficulty ... of the harmonics, would mean that all of the new channels 
would be open to that difficulty....
64 
Making implicit reference to the extension of the broadcast band from 1350 to 1500 kHz in 
1924, Langley also observed that there were actually very few receivers on the market that 
went all the way up to the then-allowable 1500 kHz.
65  “Many of the circuits now in use are 
extremely difficult to stabilize,” he explained, “especially the upper frequency.  Some of the 
circuits now in use ... would be impossible to stabilize at very much higher than 1500 
kilocycles, and some new means would have to be provided to get a suitable amplification at 
the higher frequencies.”  Like Hazeltine, he predicted that to “build a receiver which would 
be as satisfactory as the better receivers are today would make it cost considerably more.”
66 
  Dr. Alfred N. Goldsmith, Chairman of the Board of Consulting Engineers for NBC 
and a luminary in the field of radio engineering, began his comments by acknowledging the 
problem that expansion of the band was intended to solve.  The existing broadcasting band 
(from 550 to 1500 kHz) provided 95 channels,
67 six of which had been allotted to Canada.  
The remaining 89 “American channels are now called upon to accommodate more than 730 
existing broadcasting stations.  The congestion is, therefore, extreme and the interference 
correspondingly great.”  For this reason, expansion of the band had to be considered.  “In 
the abstract,” Goldsmith declared, “there can be no objection to the widening of the 
frequency bands ... provided the additional frequencies ... are suitable for broadcasting....  It 
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must be recognized, however, that the usefulness of such frequencies for this purpose has 
not been demonstrated by large scale experiments up to the present time.”
68 
  Although most of the engineers who testified on the expansion issue at the FRC 
hearings were affiliated with either a broadcasting company or (more commonly) a radio 
manufacturer, there were others present who were not so affiliated.  John Dellinger, chief of 
the Bureau of Standards’ Radio Section in 1927, had been president of the Institute of Radio 
Engineers (IRE) in 1925 and director from 1924-27.  (He subsequently served as Chief 
Engineer for the FRC from 1928-29 and, in 1938, was awarded the IRE Medal of Honor.)  
While Dellinger did not explicitly comment on expansion at the FRC hearings, he did speak 
at great length about the problem of heterodyne interference, which he characterized as 
“probably the worst thing we have to combat in the radio broadcasting allocation today.”
69 
  In addition, the Radio Broadcast Committee of the American Engineering Council 
issued a report, which was presented to the FRC at the March 30 hearing, offering a 
“compilation of engineering principles and facts believed to affect the duties of the Federal 
Radio Commission.”
70  Among other things, the report concluded that the proposal to widen 
the broadcast band “is not now practicable” because such widening would impinge on 
“other useful radio services,” would render millions of existing sets obsolete, would require 
more complicated and more expensive radio receivers, and would “increase the number of 
stations open to interference from harmonics or other broadcasting stations.”
71 
5.2  Radio Manufacturers 
  To a large extent, the position of radio manufacturers on the question of widening 
the spectrum has already been presented, since many of the engineers just quoted were 
affiliated with manufacturing companies and were specifically lined up to speak at the FRC 
hearings by the Radio Manufacturers’ Association.
72  In his letter to the commission, Louis 
Hazeltine quoted a recent resolution in which “engineers associated with the Independent 
Radio Manufacturers, Inc., and with the Hazeltine Corporation, assembled in conference on 
                                                 
68 Minutes, March 29, 1927, 22-23. 
69 Minutes, March 30, 1927, 116.  Three years later, Dellinger published an article noting that although the 
notion of expanding the broadcast band “has been a major issue at every national and international radio 
conference since 1924,” these conferences had “uniformly concluded that extension of the broadcast range of 
frequencies is impracticable for several reasons” [John H. Dellinger, The Broadcasting Band, in Radio and its 
Future 293 (Martin Codel ed. 1930)]. 
70 Minutes, March 30, 1927, 200. 
71 Minutes, March 30, 1927, 202-203. The committee comprised both affiliated engineers (such as Calvert 
Townley, assistant to the President of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Alfred 
Goldsmith of NBC, David Sarnoff of RCA, and L.E. Whittemore of ATT) and unaffiliated engineers (such as 
John Dellinger of the Bureau of Standards and C. Moreau Jansky Jr., Assistant Professor of Radio Engineering 
at the Univesity of Minnesota).  See Will Survey Radio Needs: Engineering Council Names Committee to 
Suggest Control Legislation, N. Y. Times, Jan 14, 1927, at 10.  Note that Jansky, characterized in his obituary 
as a “pioneer in radio broadcasting” subsequently was “co-founder and chairman of Jansky & Bailey, a 
consulting engineering company formed in 1930...” [C. Moreau Jansky Jr., 79, Pioneer in Radio Broadcast, N. 
Y. Times, March 27, 1975, at 28]. 
72 Minutes, March 29, 1927, 5-6. Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  18
March 17, 1927,” unanimously resolved “that in the present state of the radio art, it would 
be against the best interests of the broadcast listening public to increase the frequency 
band....”
73  
  An intriguing question – especially for students of the economic theory of regulation 
– is why radio manufacturers would oppose expansion of the broadcasting band in the first 
place, since one might assume they would stand to benefit from increased demand for new 
radios.  By the beginning of 1927, the number of American homes with radio receivers had 
reached 6.5 million.  Since 1922, when only 60,000 homes had radio sets, the increase in 
radio penetration had been about 1 to 1.5 million homes per year.
74  Given this, one might 
think manufacturers would have found the prospect of obsolescing a large part of the 
existing stock to be absolutely tantalizing.  But apparently they had other concerns. 
  One possible explanation that deserves consideration is that the manufacturers 
opposed widening the band because they owned a large number of radio stations, which 
they wanted to protect against competition.  One problem here is that most manufacturers at 
the time had a much larger stake in radio manufacturing than in radio broadcasting, 
particularly since most broadcasters were still making little if any money and annual radio 
sales remained exceedingly large.  Another problem is that the opposition to widening 
expressed at the hearings was voiced at least as strongly, if not more strongly, by 
manufacturers with no discernible connection to broadcasting, such as Jack Binns, treasurer 
of the Hazeltine Corporation, and L.P.F. Raycroft of the Electric Storage Battery 
Company.
75 
  Indeed, Raycroft himself insisted that the reason he and his fellow manufacturers 
opposed widening the band was that it would harm them by harming their customers, the 
nation’s radio listeners.  “The radio broadcast listeners are by all means our customers and 
our customers must be satisfied,” he said.
76  Raycroft was speaking on behalf of the radio 
division of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, the members of which, he 
claimed, accounted for more than three-quarters of radio production in the United States.
77  
The main problem, as he saw it, was that widening the band would render existing radios 
obsolete.  And this was no small matter, since he estimated that the average radio cost about 
$100 in 1927,
78 w h i c h  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  1 0  p e r c e n t  o f  per capita GDP at the time (the 
equivalent of more than $4500 today).  “Gentleman,” he declared at the hearings,  
I want to tell you this; when we appeared before the Congress in the 
strongest sort of support for the legislation [the Radio Act of 1927] which is 
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now made effective, and we did so as radio manufacturers trying to protect 
our interests and the interests of the radio broadcast listener at large, our 
customers, we never conceived for one moment that we would come before 
any established commission and ask that it take any steps which would make 
practically the entire number of sets in the country obsolete, either in whole 
or in part, and we refuse to take that position today.  As radio manufacturers, 
we cannot afford, in accordance of our own ethics, to appear in support of 
that proposition.
79 
  Whether the radio manufacturers were truly motivated by an unwillingness to anger 
their customers (over 1.5 million of whom had bought new sets in just the last year alone), 
or perhaps by some other fear or objective, is impossible to say with certainty.  Patent 
holders may have worried that their patents would be rendered obsolete by the change.  Or, 
alternatively, smaller producers may have worried that the giants, like RCA, would gain 
even greater control over the industry as a result of their superior research capabilities.  In 
fact, there are many possible explanations.  Unfortunately, we were unable to find 
appropriate and compelling evidence that distinguishes between them.   
  Still, the position of manufacturers at the hearings was clear.  Langley (of the 
Crosley Radio Corporation) observed that if the broadcasting band were widened, it would 
“immediately obsolete not only the receivers which broadcast listeners have already 
purchased, but also the receivers which are now on the shelves in dealers’ stores, and also 
the receivers which are now in the process of being put into production in factories of the 
manufacturers.”
80  What is more, “there would be a period of three, four or five months 
during which all the manufacturers would have to work under intense pressure to develop 
some new form of receiver that would cover the band.”  While he insisted that he personally 
was “not a bit loathe to undertake that work for myself and my group of engineers” (since it 
would be “a very interesting engineering problem”), he simply could “see ... no great 
advantage to the listening public or to the radio manufacturers in any extension of the 
broadcast band.”
81 
5.3  Amateur Radio Operators and Experimenters 
  The proposal to expand the broadcast band provoked a particularly fierce response 
from amateur radio operators.  This was mostly because the wavelengths under 
consideration had, for some time, been the domain of the amateurs.  From the perspective of 
the amateur operator, commercial broadcasting from 1500 to 2000 kHz would amount to 
criminal trespass on his own precious real estate. 
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On the very first day of the hearings, Secretary K. B. Warner of the American Radio 
Relay League (ARRL)
82 dismissed claims that amateurs were no longer interested in the 
1500-2000 kHz band, emphasizing that only this band could be used for voice 
communications: “This is the only amateur band in which really successful amateur 
telephony is possible, because all of our shorter waves [higher frequencies] are subject to 
technical difficulties such as audio-frequency fading which, while they do not adversely 
affect telegraphy, do make it extremely difficult to carry on successful telephony.”
83  If there 
were to be any significant advances made in voice transmission, he argued, it would need to 
take place in the 1500-2000 kHz band. 
The commissioners had good reason to take the amateurs seriously.  Many radio 
amateurs began as military radio operators during the war, and amateur use allowed them to 
continue to hone their skills.  Furthermore, amateurs had historically been at the forefront of 
radio innovation, having shown not only that frequencies above 1500 kHz could be used, 
but also that they propagated to far greater range than those below.  Confined to the so-
called trash wave lengths, early radio amateurs took great pride in their successful trans-
continental and trans-oceanic communications.
84 According to the 1930 president of the 
ARRL, “the success of the amateur with his short waves naturally stimulated all manner of 
commercial aspiration.”  As the broadcast spectrum crowded, the ARRL feared this meant 
“ejecting the amateurs from some of the territory that they had done so much to pioneer.”
85   
Another speaker, C. Francis Jenkins, was even more adamant about what could be 
lost to society if amateurs were deprived of the frequencies above 1500 kHz.  An inventor 
and amateur lab operator experimenting with the broadcast of still images (or 
“radiofacsimile”), Jenkins urged that “this band below 200 meters [above 1500 kHz] should 
be kept more or less virgin field for the amateurs who have no particular object other than 
that of developing useful applications of radio.”
86  He no doubt captured the attention – and 
the imagination – of the commissioners when he began speculating about the possibility of 
broadcasting moving pictures over the airwaves: 
Presently, when what we call still pictures are considered fairly well 
launched on their useful career, we want to take up a still further 
development, which has been shown by experiment to be perfectly feasible 
with the apparatus that we have today, and that is radio vision, the ability to 
see on a small white screen, if you like, what is happening at a distant 
place.
87 
The one catch, he suggested, was that experiments of this sort would have to take place in 
precisely the same part of the spectrum that the commission was considering giving away to 
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radio broadcasters:  “[B]ecause we need electrical pulsations to make up radio vision, 
electrical pulsations of such high frequency, we rather expect that it is in the amateur band 
only that radio vision is possible.”
88   
  Apparently tantalized by the specter that Jenkins had conjured up, the 
commissioners ultimately relied heavily on the promise of experimentation in justifying 
their decision not to expand the broadcast band.  According to the FRC’s General Order no. 
4, “the band between 1,500 and 2,000 kilocycles (199.9 to 149.9 meters) should, so far as 
may be practicable, be held open for experimental work in broadcasting and allied forms of 
radio service, to the end that, with the further development of the art, this band may be 
eventually made available for broadcasting, whether for the ear or the eye.”
89   
 Although  radiofacsimile  never took off, the FRC did make good on its promise that 
the frequencies near to the existing band be used for experimentation with new forms of 
broadcasting.  Jenkins himself received the very first license for an experimental 1927 
television station, W3XK, in the adjacent 2000-2100 kHz band.
90  Furthermore, throughout 
the 1930s, several high-fidelity AM stations operated with experimental licenses between 
1500 and 1600 kHz, each occupying 20 kHz of bandwidth.
91 In 1936, W2XR famously 
received an experimental license for high-fidelity stereo broadcasting.
92  When regulators 
officially expanded the broadcasting spectrum to 1600 kHz in 1941, W2XR began operation 
as WQXR, which continues to operate to this day (on FM) as one of New York’s most 
popular classical stations. 
5.4  Radio Listeners 
  As the commissioners themselves repeatedly noted, listeners were the commission’s 
most important constituents.  To quote Commissioner Bellows, “[I]t is the radio listener we 
must consider above everybody else.”
93  The problem, of course, is that listeners were not as 
well organized as most of the other interests.  Consequently, listener representation at the 
FRC hearings was not very strong.  But neither was it missing altogether. 
  According to those who claimed to represent them, listeners preferred a smaller 
number of good stations to a larger number of poor and overlapping ones.
94  Francis St. 
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Austell, president of the Iowa Radio Listeners’ League, exclaimed on the second day of the 
hearings: 
      The broadcaster at the present time has brought about a great deal of 
confusion for the simple reason that there are so many stations on the air that 
the ordinary listener, with a $150 set is practically incompetent to get 
anything. ... 
   Damn it, I don’t want to listen to a lot of rotten stuff over the air, but I want 
to listen to something good, to a good concert, for instance, and feel that the 
broadcaster is a friend of mine, and that he is not an enemy of the other 
broadcasters.  ... 
   ...  We do not want 733, or whatever the number is, on the air; we want to 
get good broadcasting....
95 
L. P. F. Raycroft, a manufacturer, agreed:  “I could say 90% easily, of all the broadcast 
listeners with whom I have spoken, have stated in regard to the question as to the number of 
broadcast stations that should be allowed upon the air, that they did not care how few they 
were if they could have such and such a station left, and in some localities it was WJZ, and 
in others WEAF, and in others other stations.”  Raycroft added that the days of listeners 
trying to hear every last station – “and add those scalps to their belt” – were basically gone.  
What the listeners had come to want “was good substantial broadcasting of a quality 
character, and … they are willing to hook up pretty well to one, or a small number of large 
stations, or nearby stations to satisfy that desire on their part.”
96 
Interestingly, Raycroft also reported on some correspondence he had had with the 
Broadcast Listeners’ Association of Minneapolis – specifically regarding one of the 
association’s resolutions that seemed to favor broadening of the broadcast band.  When he 
wrote to the association on “January 7
th and called their attention to some of the difficulties 
involved in their suggestion on the basis of good engineering advice,” their response was 
telling:   
You will note from a careful reading [of the resolution] that we do not urge 
this change but that we suggested that Congress encourage a study of the 
matter by competent engineers....  We are not sure that this would be a good 
thing for radio but hold our minds open for competent advice in these 
matters so the real purpose of that recommendation was to accomplish the 
result that has been brought about, namely, an intelligent discussion both for 
and against the proposal ... and therefore, we are not urging the change 
unless it should be found entirely practicable and an advantage to the 
advancement of radio.
97 
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Willing to entertain widening of the band so long as it was “entirely practicable,” the 
Broadcast Listeners’ Association of Minneapolis appears to have taken a position 
remarkably similar to that of Goldsmith at NBC. 
  On the final day of the hearings, P. A. Green of the United States Radio Society, a 
national radio listeners’ organization, reinforced the notion that the costs of widening the 
band likely outweighed the benefits.  “Although the opinions of the radio listeners of the 
United States have not been presented on this particular subject,” he remarked, “I am of the 
opinion that to widen the band at this time would possibly work a hardship on the present 
users of radio receiving sets.  Therefore the society recommends that the broadcasting 
stations be assigned frequencies within the now existing bands.”
98  Apparently, the threat of 
having their radios rendered obsolete – or, at least, no longer complete – was a real concern 
to listeners.
99 
  At least one prominent radio enthusiasts and listeners’ magazine, moreover, 
staunchly opposed widening the band, both in contemporary articles and through its 
representative who spoke at the hearings, offering further evidence of where listeners stood 
on this issue.  The magazine was none other than Radio Broadcast.
100  Its editors certainly 
minced no words, urging the commission in its articles “to dispose of such dangerous 
propositions as the pressure to extend the broadcast band downward, brought by short-
sighted would-be broadcasters and selfish set manufacturers, seeking to create an artificial 
market for short-wave receivers....”
101  Like some of the other listeners’ representatives 
already quoted, the magazine subscribed to the notion that less was more, as far as radio 
listeners were concerned, since interference compromised reception: “The principle must be 
recognized that the fewer broadcasting stations there are on the air, the more stations the 
listener can enjoy.”
102  Expansion of the broadcasting band was decidedly not the answer. 
5.5  Radio Broadcasters 
  In some ways, the position of the broadcasters on the proposal to widen the band 
paralleled that of the manufacturers.  In fact, the very same person who lined up speakers for 
the Radio Manufactures’ Association also lined up speakers for the National Association of 
Broadcasters.  Frank D. Scott, a former congressman from Michigan, represented both 
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organizations at the hearings and put together a combined slate of speakers, who spoke at 
the outset of the first session.
103  
  Without question, one can find statements of naked self-interest on the part of some 
broadcasters, just as one might expect from incumbents trying to protect their competitive 
positions.  Ira Nelson of WAAM in Newark, for example, announced on the third day of 
hearings that the central question was: “Who shall broadcast?”
104  In answering this question, 
he cautioned that “[i]t should not be our attitude to foster the inauguration of many stations, 
realizing that most of them will find it well-nigh impossible to earn three squares a day.”  
New entrants were continually coming into broadcasting, he lamented, despite “a great 
many warnings of deep water ahead to our new brethren....  The increased number of 
broadcasting stations has worked a great hardship upon already established commercial 
organization[s] who have for years been building up audiences and services so that they 
might have something to sell....”
105  What was necessary, he believed, was not for the 
commission “to open any more broadcasting channels” but for it to weed out weak stations, 
based on “their respective incomes in payment of their services, and the degree of 
satisfaction they have produced for their clients.”
106  Ultimately, the commission would have 
to decide “who shall stay, taking into consideration only one class.  Commercial stations 
who have a previous record of faithful service, should be retained.”
107 
  In spite of the comments of Nelson and others, what is most striking about the 
commercial broadcasters is that they were – if anything – less unified and less vehement in 
their opposition to the proposal for widening the broadcast band than were most other 
groups represented at the hearings.  In fact, at least as many broadcasters spoke for the 
proposal as spoke against it.
108  Ira Nelson, it turns out, did not represent all of his brethren in 
the broadcasting industry.   
  As we have seen (in the section on engineers), Alfred Goldsmith expressed 
ambivalence about the proposal to widen the band, even though he was Chairman of the 
Board of Consulting Engineers of NBC, which was the dominant radio network at the time 
and whose parent companies owned ten of the country’s largest and oldest broadcasting 
stations.  In fact, when Goldsmith finally summarized the position of NBC on the issue, it 
fell somewhere between weak support and weak opposition. “The ... National Broadcasting 
Company,” he maintained, “is not opposed to widening the wave band whenever it is 
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demonstrated to be technically feasible, and when this could be done without interference 
with other established radio services.”
109 
  Even more remarkable were the comments of another broadcaster, H. V. Hough of 
WBAP in Texas, who tried – on the third day of the FRC hearings – to resurrect the 
proposal for widening the band, which already appeared dead by the end of the first day due 
to lack of support.  Hough had been operating WBAP for five years, and by 1927 was 
licensed for the very desirable 600 kHz frequency and a substantial 1500 watts of power.
110  
By almost any definition, he was an incumbent broadcaster.  Yet after sitting through the 
hearings and listening to attacks on one proposal after another for dealing with the 
interference problem, he began to think that the original proposal to widen the band might 
not be so bad after all: 
   You are hunting a solution of a problem, and I have been sitting here two 
or three days getting hopelessly confused all the time. ... 
   We have had quite a bit of discussion, and what we want to do, I believe, is 
to eliminate stations or eliminate interference, one or the other.  One goes 
with the other.  It just occurs to me that when we got up on our feet and told 
the Commission that we did not think it was a good idea to open up those 
lower wave bands we were traveling around in a pasture that was a good deal 
greener than we thought it was.  ... 
   Some folks say that it would not be very profitable down there.  I certainly 
would like to have a wave band for myself down about 200 meters, and in 
two years from now it would be as important as any other place.  When they 
moved us from 360 to 400 they said that nobody would listen, and then later 
on they moved us again, and the same thing was said.  It would be a sporting 
proposition for a man to go down there and get something that the other 
fellow has not got, and then the next day the next man would be getting it, 
too, because each man wishes to be as well posted as his neighbor. 
   We have looked around in these pastures and we are right back in a circle.  
The proposition you submitted in reference to opening up the lower wave 
bands may be, after all, the solution, and we have not been able to locate it.
111 
Here was a “sporting proposition” indeed – coming from an incumbent broadcaster – for 
some new competition in the outer reaches of an expanded band! 
  Ironically, it was not a commercial broadcaster but rather a non-profit broadcaster 
who articulated perhaps the clearest and most unequivocal statement of opposition to 
expansion on the third day of the hearings.  When another speaker proposed that educational 
stations should be allocated the 1500-1600 kHz frequencies, for which special educational 
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band radios could be produced, C. A. Culver, president of the Association of College and 
University Broadcasting Stations, responded resolutely.  University broadcasters, Culver 
insisted, sought to provide more general cultural services in addition to straightforward 
education, and they would find this new fragment of spectrum “practically prohibitive, 
because the listeners would have to have special receiving sets, and that would practically 
inhibit the service that they want to give in those regions.”  Repeating his key point as he 
concluded his remarks, he again warned that “to take a band at this extreme end down below 
all the other broadcasting would be practically prohibitive and would cut [the stations that 
were moved there] out from the service they are certainly rendering now.”
112   
  Non-profits did not want to risk being reassigned to a lower wave band (higher 
frequency), which would be of lower quality and would force their listeners to purchase new 
and potentially more expensive equipment in order to hear their programs.  In fact, it may be 
that Hough of WBAP was willing to entertain the opening of new wavelengths to 
broadcasting precisely because he knew there was little or no risk of his five-year-old 
commercial station ending up there. 
  Overall, by our count, the broadcasters who spoke at the hearings divided about 
evenly between support and opposition.  H.V. Hough of WBAP ended up concluding it was 
probably the best way of addressing the interference problem; at least two other broadcasters 
weakly supported the idea; and Alfred Goldsmith of NBC expressed ambivalence.  Three 
other broadcasters (including C. A. Culver) opposed the expansion proposal at the hearings, 
two strongly and one weakly. 
  There is no way to know for sure whether the broadcasters who testified were 
representative of broadcasters more generally and, if so, why they were not more unified in 
their opposition to the expansion proposal.  Still, a few possible explanations for their lack 
of unity on the issue are worth considering.  Since it was widely believed among radio 
engineers at the time that the frequencies above 1500 kHz were inferior as far as 
broadcasting was concerned, incumbent broadcasters with the requisite technical expertise 
may not have felt particularly threatened by the prospect of new competitors broadcasting 
on those upper frequencies.  In fact, expansion could well have been regarded – as it was 
when the edge of the band was shifted from 1350 to 1500 kHz in 1924
113 – as a way of 
clearing out the good frequencies, by moving the weak (some would say, bothersome) 
stations off to the periphery.  From NBC’s perspective, moreover, additional room for more 
broadcasters was not necessarily a net negative, since the added stations could create 
additional demand both for one of its primary products (radio programs sold to affiliate 
stations) and for one of the primary products of its parent company (radio receivers).   
Finally, since radio advertising remained rather primitive by today’s standards and since 
relatively few stations were making much money, the rents that incumbents might have 
sought to protect may not have appeared nearly as large or as promising back then as they 
would to us now, biased as we are by today’s far more lucrative radio environment.
114 
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6.  A Search for Additional Evidence of Regulatory Rents 
In reviewing the history of the FRC decision, we also searched for additional 
confirming evidence of the capture interpretation – especially for any indication that the 
federal commissioners derived improper personal benefits from those they were regulating.  
But we were able to find little evidence of this kind. 
Students of political economy sometimes point to turnover between public and 
private practice in an industry – the so-called revolving door – as evidence of rent-seeking.
115  
Those moving from industry to government may seek to control regulation to benefit their 
friends and their investments, while those remaining in industry may reward regulators with 
high-paying jobs for their faithful service.   
In creating the FRC, President Coolidge appointed five members: Henry A. Bellows, 
John F. Dillon, Eugene O. Sykes, Orestes H. Caldwell, and William H. G. Bullard.  Of the 
five, Commissioner Bellows did enter public service after managing a commercial station.  
Of the four remaining commissioners, two were government radio authorities, one was a 
magazine editor, and another was a Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
116  If Bellows 
were indeed a broadcasting insider, then broadcasters chose rather poorly, since he left the 
commission on October 8, 1927, less than seven months after the commission was 
formed.
117 His reason for leaving was not framed as a whim or an act of conscience, but a 
financial reality. Congress had failed to approve the Commissioners’ salaries, and Bellows 
did not have the resources to wait for back pay.  In his own words, he was “starved out,”
118 
forced to return to his old employer, WCCO.  
Thus only one commissioner entered from broadcasting, and only one, the same one, 
returned there.  Dillon and Bullard’s deaths seven and eight months into their terms 
complicate this conclusion;
119 but Caldwell returned to his magazine post by 1930,
120 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
this from the public by taking a more moderate position at the hearings.  While this explanation is possible, we 
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Sykes remained a member of the FRC and then the FCC for 12 years before retiring to legal 
private practice.
121  Even Bellows’s immediate departure was merely to his former position 
in broadcasting.  By 1930, Bellows had accepted a vice presidency at CBS.
122 CBS, 
however, had only been broadcasting for a few weeks when Bellows left the Commission,
123 
and it still had little credibility in the industry and remained financially tenuous at the end of 
1927.
124 If one had tried to predict which of the two networks during Bellows’s tenure would 
seek favors from a commissioner or reward a commissioner’s services with an executive 
position, NBC would have been the obvious candidate. Since Bellows did not end up at 
NBC, but actually found high-level work at its primary competitor, one would be hard-
pressed to call his career path obvious evidence of rent seeking.   
Another standard argument in the literature is that legislators, themselves beholden 
to powerful interests, may tie regulators’ reappointments to satisfactory treatment of the 
regulated.
125  Here, in contrast to the prior argument, capture is suggested when regulators 
have long, rather than short, tenures in government.  While some scholars have alleged that 
“uncertainty of tenure made the Commissioners timid rather than aggressive,”
126 the 
evidence that commissioners might have been willing to trade favors for extended tenure is 
not strong.  We cannot assess the reappointment futures of Dillon and Bullard because of 
their early deaths.  Of the remaining commissioners, only Sykes and Caldwell reached the 
annual reappointment stage.  Of those two, Sykes, whose tenure lasted 12 years, was the 
only one even to stay as long as what would become one full 5-year term under the 
permanent FCC.  
Although there is relatively little evidence to suggest suspicious career paths on the 
part of those who made the spectrum decision, one might still wonder whether the 
commissioners received other sorts of benefits from those they were regulating in return for 
their cooperation.  Initial suspicions are raised by two letters, one in 1932 from 
Commissioner Henry LaFount (who was not involved in the spectrum decision) and another 
in 1933 from Sykes (who was involved in the spectrum decision), both of whom asked high-
level NBC employees to consider their acquaintances for positions at the network.
127  But 
inspection of the only relevant personnel records that were available to us, from 1937 and 
1942, offers no evidence that NBC had placed either one of the recommended individuals in 
any significant position in the corporation during those years.
128   
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Of course, it is possible that the commissioners did receive inappropriate payments 
from those they were regulating, but that these payments have remained invisible because 
they were so well hidden at the time.  All we can say is that we were unable to find any 
indication of such payments in the available historical records. 
7.  Conclusion 
  This paper has examined the proposition that, in refusing to expand the broadcast 
band in 1927, the FRC was responding to the appeals of incumbent broadcasters to advance 
their own special interest at the expense of the public interest – that this FRC decision was, 
in short, captured by the broadcasters.  Prior studies have highlighted evidence consistent 
with this proposition: namely, the opposition of incumbent broadcasters to the expansion 
proposal.  However, upon further review of the record, we found little in the way of 
additional confirming evidence.  We also found powerful disconfirming evidence, which we 
believe outweighs the available supporting evidence in this case. 
Most notably, we found that every major interest group – not just broadcasters – 
opposed the expansion proposal.  This is significant because it suggests that the FRC 
commissioners had no reason to believe that maintaining the existing band would violate the 
public interest in the service of any particular special interest.  It also raises the question of 
why incumbent broadcasters would have needed to expend resources to “capture” a decision 
that, given the broad agreement of other interests, was nearly a forgone conclusion in any 
case. 
We also were surprised to discover that the broadcasters who testified at the FRC 
hearings were themselves divided on the issue, with some opposing expansion and others 
apparently willing to support it.  Admittedly, only a small number of broadcasters testified at 
the hearings, and there is no reason to believe that they necessarily constituted a 
representative sample.  Yet until additional documents shedding light on the broadcaster 
position are uncovered, this is the best indication we have.  (Recall that prior “evidence” of 
intense – and presumably unified – broadcaster opposition to the expansion proposal was 
mistakenly based on quotes from a radio listeners’ journal, rather than a broadcasters’ 
journal.  See appendix.) 
Finally, the historical record suggests that in early 1927, there was still little 
agreement whether radio broadcasting would ever be profitable.  Thus, it seems likely that 
the rents that could have accrued from limiting entry might have appeared less impressive 
(and perhaps far less impressive) to broadcasters at the time – i.e., prospectively – than they 
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do retrospectively today.  While we do not doubt that incumbent broadcasters ultimately 
may have benefited from the FRC’s decision not to expand the band, we simply suggest that 
the broadcasters themselves may not have fully anticipated the potential gains at the time. 
Of course, none of these findings contradict the economic theory of regulation itself, 
since we would expect, based on the theory, that a regulatory proposal opposed by all major 
interest groups would ultimately be rejected by regulators.  The evidence presented here is 
inconsistent only with a capture interpretation of the episode.  This is significant, however, 
because it means that we cannot use the episode to discriminate in favor of the economic 
theory of regulation on the one hand as compared to a public-interest interpretation on the 
other. 
For a case to contradict the economic theory of regulation outright, it would have to 
involve the converse of capture.  As Stigler himself once suggested, “the theory would be 
contradicted if, for a given regulatory policy, we found the group with larger benefits and 
lower costs of political action being dominated by another group with lesser benefits and 
higher cost of political action.”
129  Students of law and economics, as good scientists, 
should look hard for examples of this sort – precisely because the theory predicts that 
“[t]emporary accidents aside, such cases simply will not arise….”
130   
Medicare’s enactment in 1965 might conceivably constitute such a case, since the 
most powerful and well-organized interest group involved, the American Medical 
Association (which represented individuals with arguably the most at stake – physicians), 
failed in its very determined and well-funded effort to stop the legislation.
131  It has also 
been suggested that the passage of anti-gouging laws may contradict a capture 
interpretation: “The affected firms lose money, and the ‘winners’ (namely the consumers 
that end up paying lower prices) are quite scattered.  Indeed, it is difficult to know [in 
advance] which consumer will win by paying a low price and which consumer will lose 
by being rationed.”
132 
Further historical research would naturally be required to determine if either of these 
cases, or if other historical cases, are consistent or inconsistent with the economic theory of 
regulation.  But this is precisely the point.  Further (and finer grained) historical research is 
needed if we wish to test the economic theory of regulation and enhance our understanding 
of the conditions under which it does (and does not) apply.  Quick-and-dirty history is not 
only not sufficient, it is also potentially dangerous since it may lead us to false conclusions 
and provide false confidence in our priors. 
It is certainly reasonable, as George Stigler suggested more than thirty years ago, to 
derive historical inferences from a compelling theory.  But history should also be used as an 
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independent test of theory; and this must involve more than merely a search for confirming 
evidence (which, by itself, represents the historical equivalent of data mining).  What might 
be called history-by-inference is never a legitimate test.   Perusing the historical record for 
evidence that seems to support a favorite theory may provide some emotional comfort, but it 
is decidedly not the stuff of good science.  Rather, good science requires that we search 
vigorously for disconfirming evidence as well – the goal being always to challenge the 
prevailing theory, to find its limits, to move beyond it, and never simply to protect it for its 
own sake.   Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  32
Appendix: Reassessing a Critical Source (Radio Broadcast) 
The standard interpretation of the spectrum-expansion episode, which alleges 
capture by radio broadcasters, rests to a significant extent on evidence drawn from the “trade 
journal” Radio Broadcast.
133  Close inspection of the publication, however, makes clear that 
it was not a broadcasters’ trade journal.  Rather, as other students of radio history have 
pointed out, it was “a general-interest magazine for radio enthusiasts.”
134  
Because this determination regarding Radio Broadcast is of such significance in 
assessing the FRC’s expansion decision in 1927, we did not rely solely on interpretations in 
the literature, but also thoroughly investigated the question ourselves, on the basis of 
primary documents.  In our view, the evidence that Radio Broadcast was aimed at listeners 
and radio enthusiasts, not incumbent broadcasters, is simply overwhelming. 
We began with an examination of the inset advertisements, which typically suggest 
the type of people that advertisers believe read a magazine.  If Radio Broadcast were a trade 
journal for broadcasters, one might expect announcements of broadcaster conventions, or 
perhaps promotions for microphones or transmitter components.  Instead, most of the 
advertisements are for radio receivers and batteries.
135  One of the more colorful spots 
announced the winner of a “Universal Reception Contest” who was able to receive 120 
stations on his set,
136 and another offered readers the opportunity to “earn $50 to $250 a 
week in RADIO,” under the tutelage of “Master Radio Engineers.”
137  The advertisements 
indicate a presumed readership of audiophiles with long-distance receivers, not broadcasters.  
Interestingly, when the magazine’s publisher, Doubleday, Page & Co., advertised Radio 
Broadcast in the New York Times, it promoted it (beside World’s Work, Country Life, and 
Garden Magazine) as the magazine that “covers entertainingly and authoritatively every 
conceivable radio topic from the simplest to the most advanced.”
138 
Technical articles constitute the majority of Radio Broadcast.  Again, if this were a 
broadcasting trade publication, one might find suggestions for improving broadcasting 
range, or reviews of new broadcasting equipment, or simply technical articles that discuss 
broadcasting to any extent whatsoever.  Instead, these articles are consistently aimed at those 
building or modifying receivers.  The March 1926 issue included the articles “Shall I Buy a 
Factory-Built Receiver,” “Will the New Type of Condenser Improve My Set,” “The RADIO 
BROADCAST Local Receiver,” “The $500 Short-Wave Receiver Contest,” “Trickle 
                                                 
133 Hazlett, Rationality, 154.  Hazlett characterized Radio Broadcast as a “trade journal” in a section entitled 
“The Agenda of the Radio Broadcasting Interests.” 
134 Huseyin Leblebici et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of Interorganizational Fields: An 
Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry, 36 Administrative Science Quarterly 333 
(September 1991). 
135 In the May 1926 issue of Radio Broadcast, there were 10 advertisements for radio set batteries, three for 
pre-built sets, and one for volume controls, out of 18 advertisements total. 
136 Id .at 15. 
137 Id. at 74. 
138 See e.g. Display Ad no. 60, N. Y. Times, Sept 9, 1923, at BR32.  See also Display Ad no. 53, N.Y. Times, 
Oct 18, 1925, at BR13. Moss and Lackow, Rethinking the Role of History in Law & Economics (7.13.08)  33
Chargers for Your A Battery,” and “Testing and Operating the ‘Aristocat,’” a new 
receiver.
139  Additionally, a section “devoted to Solving the Problems of our Readers,” 
answers questions like, “My receiver tunes broadly, how may I correct this?” and “I am 
bothered with a persistent singing noise in my receiver.”
140   
The only other major section of Radio Broadcast is “The March of Radio: News and 
Interpretation of Current Radio Events.”  Far from being the steadfast voice of “radio men,” 
this section is at times vociferously pro-listener and anti-industry.  In the article “What Does 
the Listener Want? Let Him Speak,” the staff writes: “Gentlemen of the Radio Commission, 
let but one voice rule you!  The voice of the broadcast listener!  Give him fair, efficient, and 
equitable service!  Remember, not one of those who seek to broadcast has anything but a 
selfish purpose, however disguised, in seeking a place in the ether!”
141  This same article 
urges listener coordination with all the fervor of a labor organizer: “The lack of organization 
of broadcast listeners is a menace to their interests, a condition which would be quickly 
alleviated by the formation of a truly national listener organization.”
142  Another article 
proposes a plan for consolidating local stations under more powerful transmitters, so that 
“the monopoly of good broadcasting now held by the chain system [networks] would at last 
be faced with real and sorely needed competition.”
143  In short, “The March of Radio” 
sometimes assumed an anti-broadcaster perspective, including during the period of the 
FRC’s founding.  Unfortunately, it is from this section that Hazlett pulled his most damning 
quotes detailing the “agenda of the radio broadcasting interests.”
144  
As Hazlett notes, Radio Broadcast did contain a monthly feature entitled “As the 
Broadcaster Sees It,” authored by Carl Dreher.  But while the column consistently sounded 
the broadcaster’s self-interested voice, its title alone suggests that the way the broadcaster 
saw it was not necessarily the way the rest of the magazine – contributors or readership – 
saw it.
145 
In 1926, the magazine provided a brief statistical survey of its own readership, 
entitled “Meet Mr. Average Radio Enthusiast.”  According to the magazine, more than 2000 
readers were surveyed by mail (out of a total readership of approximately 8700), and more 
than 700 responded.  Of the respondents, 39.2 percent were involved in the “radio business 
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or allied industries,” including “electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, telephone 
engineers, electricians, scientists and research engineers, as well as radio engineers, jobbers, 
dealers, and manufacturers.”  Another 12.4 percent were skilled workers, such as 
“draftsmen, carpenters, engravers, expert mechanics and the like.”  Independent merchants 
(including “druggists, jewelers, bakers, opticians, contractors and realtors”) comprised 11.9 
percent of respondents.  A group labeled “professional men,” which included “[d]entists, 
surgeons, librarians, lawyers, writers, ministers, architects, and a score of other learned 
professions,” came in at 11.8 percent.  Executives (“the patricians of industry and 
commerce—bankers, manufacturers, railroad officials, exporters, and importers”) comprised 
another 11.5 percent.  Office workers (i.e., “clerks, accountants, salesmen, agents, customs 
inspectors”) accounted for 10.2 percent of respondents.  The magazine reported that the 
remaining 7.8 percent “were divided among students (5 per cent.), sailors, army and navy 
officers, coal heavers (a total of one), housewives, and miscellaneous other defenders of the 
home.”  Throughout the article, the typical reader is referred to as “Mr. Average Radio 
Enthusiast” and “Mr. Average Listener,” hardly the way the typical reader of a broadcasters’ 
trade journal would be characterized.
146 
  By May 1929, two years after the founding of the Radio Commission, Radio 
Broadcast had indeed become a trade journal – but one for radio retailers and repairmen, 
rather than broadcasters.
147  Whereas in October of 1926 the magazine referred to its typical 
reader as “Mr. Average Listener,” in the May 1929 issue it wrote that surveys “would 
indicate that at least 84% of our subscribers are professionally connected with the industry 
and a very high percentage of them are dealers.”
148  Out of 33 advertisements, none targeted 
battery-seeking home tinkerers.  Instead, 22 were for radio replacement parts, primarily 
vacuum tubes, largely directed at repairmen: one radio “diagnometer” noted its 
troubleshooting utility for “radio service and selling,”
149 and another ad was titled, simply, 
“Radio Servicemen.”
150   There were only two advertisements for pre-built sets, yet one 
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other manufacturer advertised “tube branding machines” that would allow any small 
operator to put its trademark on vacuum tubes.
151  Instead of articles like “What Does the 
Listener Want? Let Him Speak,”
152 from May of 1927, the May 1929 issue published “How 
Sales and Service Are Related,”
153 “Running a Small Radio Shop,”
154 “The Serviceman’s 
Corner,”
155 “N.E.M.A. Attacks Service Education Problem,”
156 and “In the Radio 
Marketplace,” industry news focusing primarily on retailers and smaller manufacturers.
157 
 What  might  account  for such a dramatic shift in focus and readership?  One 
explanation is the rapid standardization and professionalization of radio.  The “radio listener 
and enthusiast” was now two figures instead of one.  With content-driven network 
programming, widespread radio manufacturing and retailing, and a new servicing industry, 
the days when being an Atwater Kent Hour listener meant knowing how to dissect one’s 
own receiving set were probably past.  Radio Broadcast’s already engineering-heavy focus 
transformed to serve new needs, as a trade journal for radio dealers and repairmen.   
Meanwhile, other magazines and newspapers offered entertainment news more suitable to 
the new average listener. 
  Whatever the reason, the format change failed to keep Radio Broadcast afloat.  Its 
publisher, Doubleday, dropped the magazine in April of 1930.  It became absorbed by Radio 
Digest (the Radio Digest Publishing Company’s flagship periodical) in September, 1930.
 158  
That magazine folded soon after, in 1933.
159 
Given all this, we can conclude – beyond any reasonable doubt – that Radio 
Broadcast was a radio enthusiasts and listeners’ magazine, not a trade journal for 
broadcasters, at the time the FRC took up the expansion issue.  It is of course within the 
realm of possibility that the publication, while aimed at enthusiasts and listeners, was just a 
front for powerful radio broadcasters and manufacturers who wanted invisibly to influence 
public opinion.  The editors of the magazine acknowledged at least once in 1927 that they 
occasionally received “rabid letters, accusing us of being bribed by the monopoly.”  In fact, 
they reprinted one of those letters, presumably to prove that it came from a crank rather than 
a thoughtful but concerned listener.
160  Naturally, the editors denied any suggestion “that 
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these columns are subsidized.”
161  Other than the fact that accusing letters were apparently 
received on occasion, we found no hard evidence of any sort to indicate that the publication 
was a front.  And thus we are confident that it was not.  Certainly, if it was a front, then it 
was an extraordinarily elaborate one, given its long tenure in the publishing world,
162 its high 
standing among radio experts, the enormous prestige of some of its leading editors and 
contributors (including, for example, Professor J. H. Morecroft),
163 the strong criticism of 
broadcasters that appeared in many of its columns, and the fact the evidence of collusion has 
never been uncovered. 
Although we doubt very much the magazine was a front for “big radio,” we were 
able to identify several connections between the editorial board and the radio industry.  Most 
notably, editorial board member Edgar Felix, who represented Radio Broadcast at the FRC 
hearings in the late March and early April of 1927, had worked as an executive at WEAF 
(AT&T’s station) in the early 1920s and remained a recognized expert on, and promoter of, 
indirect advertising (sponsorship) over the radio.
164  One might reasonably conclude, 
therefore, that despite the criticism of broadcasters that sometimes graced its pages, the 
leadership of this radio enthusiasts and listeners’ magazine probably did harbor some 
underlying sympathy for – and perhaps even identification with – leading broadcasters.   
Based on other pieces of evidence presented in the body of this paper, however, it seems that 
a great many listeners harbored similar sympathies, showing particular appreciation for the 
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